

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 065436

51

ORIGIN SS-05

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /006 R

66605

DRAFTED BY C:RBLACKWILL

APPROVED BY C:RBLACKWILL

S/S-O:JHOGANSON

----- 075657

O 241628Z MAR 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL HAMBURG IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 065436

FOR SONNENFELDT

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION JERUSALEM INFO USUN NEW YORK FROM
DEPT 22 MAR.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 065436

TOSEC 949

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) PFOR, UR, UN

SUBJECT:ACTION MEMORANDUM: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING GUIDE-
LINES INITIATIVE WITH SOVIETS. (S/S NO. 7505705)

TO THE SECRETARY FROM BUFFUM

1. PROBLEM. THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS SOVIET RESPONSE TO
OUR PROPOSALS FOR PEACEKEEPING GUIDELINES. THERE STILL
APPEARS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE GAP BETWEEN THE SOVIET VIEW
OF THE APPROPRIATE LATITUDE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN
THIS AREA AND OUR OWN. SHOULD WE, NEVERTHELESS, URGE THE
SOVIETS AT A HIGH LEVEL TO INSTRUCT THEIR MISSION IN NEW
YORK TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH US IN THIS AREA?
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 065436

2. BACKGROUND. THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG HELD THAT THE
SECRETARY GENERAL IS PERMITTED TOO MUCH LATITUDE IN MAKING
OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ONCE THEY
ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEY SEEK

ASSURANCE THAT NO IMPORTANT DECISION ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WILL BE TAKEN WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT. WHILE

SENSITIVE TO AVOIDING PUBLIC USE OF THE VETO WHERE POSSIBLE, THEY HAVE ARGUED FOR CONTINUING CONTROL OVER PEACEKEEPING BY PERMANENT SC MEMBERS, AND PARTICULARLY THE USSR AND US. RECENTLY, THEY HAVE RENEWED EMPHASIS ON AN OLD PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING A SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEE UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL, COMPOSED OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF COUNTRIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TROOPS TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, TO MONITOR AND APPROVE DECISIONS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL REGARDING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

US POLICY. WE HAVE TRADITIONALLY HELD THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD BE GIVEN AMPLE LATITUDE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CONDUCT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE HELD THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY ANY SET PATTERN OF COMPOSITION OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES REFLECTING REGIONAL OR IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, BUT SHOULD SELECT FROM THE AVAILABLE POSSIBILITIES A COMPOSITION TAILORED TO THE NEEDS OF THE GIVEN SITUATION AND THE SENSITIVITY OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. LIKEWISE, WE HAVE FELT THAT IN SELECTING THE FORCE COMMANDER AND GIVING HIM AN INTERPRETATION OF THE COUNCIL'S MANDATE, THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD NOT HAVE TO CHECK EACH DECISION WITH THE COUNCIL OR WITH A SUBSIDIARY ORGAN OF THE TYPE THE SOVIETS ARE PROPOSING.

NEW US INITIATIVE. IN 1973, ON YOUR INSTRUCTIONS, WE SHIFTED OUR POSITION SOMEWHAT TO PROVIDE FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY NOT ALWAYS HAVE A SECRETARY GENERAL SYMPATHETIC TO OUR CONCERNS. YOU TOLD THE ASSEMBLY IN SEPTEMBER 1973 THAT "THE TIME HAS COME TO AGREE ON PEACEKEEPING GUIDELINES SO THAT THIS ORGANIZATION CAN ACT SWIFTLY, CONFIDENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY IN FUTURE CRISES" AND THAT THE US WAS PREPARED "TO CONSIDER HOW THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN PLAY A MORE CENTRAL ROLE IN THE CONDUCT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS."

PAGE 03 STATE 065436

1974 PROPOSAL TO SOVIETS. IN MARCH 1974, WE FOLLOWED THIS UP BY HANDING THE SOVIETS A PAPER ON "PRELIMINARY US OBSERVATIONS" WHICH GAVE OUR AGREEMENT TO HAVING GENERALIZED (AS OPPOSED TO DETAILED) GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. OUR PAPER

RECOGNIZED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR A NUMBER OF PRE-LAUNCH DECISIONS INCLUDING, AS NEW CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIETS, SELECTION OF

THE FORCE COMMANDER AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE. WE ALSO AGREED TO ENSURE A MORE CENTRAL ROLE FOR THE COUNCIL IN THE POST-LAUNCH PHASE BY HAVING PERIODIC SYG REPORTS TO THE COUNCIL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ADVISORY OR CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HOWEVER, WE STATED THAT WITHIN THE PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE FORCE COMMANDER SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS (LOGISTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS WOULD THEREFORE BE LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE SYG OR THE COMMANDER). THESE PROPOSALS DID NOT ELICIT ANY POSITIVE SOVIET REACTION.

VETO BY CHALLENGE. IN NOVEMBER 1974 SOVIET MINISTER OVINNIKOV IN NEW YORK SUGGESTED INFORMALLY RETURNING TO A PREVIOUS UK IDEA OF "VETO BY CHALLENGE". THIS PROVIDES INTER ALIA THAT ANY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL WISHING TO CHALLENGE ANY OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE IN THE COURSE OF AN OPERATION COULD DEMAND A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. AFTER THE COUNCIL HAD MET, THE CHALLENGED ACTIVITY WOULD HAVE TO BE TERMINATED UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE OF THE COUNCIL INCLUDING ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS (ART. 27, PARA 3), THUS GIVING THE SOVIETS AND OURSELVES A VETO. WE REPLIED TO MINISTER OVINNIKOV IN JANUARY 1974 THAT WHILE WE HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO EXPLORE IT BILATERALLY WITH THEM ALONG WITH OUR EARLIER PROPOSALS. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS, THERE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 065436

HAS STILL BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE.

USUN COMPROMISE RECOMMENDATION. USUN HAS NOW RECOMMENDED THAT WE MAKE ANOTHER EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS, ARGUING THAT THE TENDENCY OF THE PRESENT SYG (AND VERY POSSIBLY FUTURE SYGS) TO ACCOMMODATE THE NON-ALIGNED MAJORITY SHOULD MAKE US SOMEWHAT MORE WILLING TO PLACE LIMITS ON HIS DECISION MAKING IN THE AREA OF PEACEKEEPING. USUN SUGGESTS THAT IF SOVIETS WOULD ABANDON THEIR INSISTENCE ON ESTABLISHING A SUBSIDIARY SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE TO CONTROL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, WE WOULD HAVE RELATIVELY LITTLE TO LOSE BY AGREEING TO A CAREFULLY DELIMITED VETO BY CHALLENGE PROCEDURE COVERING OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES, PROVIDED THAT IT WOULD APPLY ONLY TO INITIATIVES "WHICH MAY AFFECT THE NATURE OR THE

CONTINUED EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE FORCE" (PHRASE FROM UNEF MANDATE). IT WOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT, AS STATED IN THE UK PROPOSAL, SUCH PEACEKEEPING DECISIONS AS MAY BE CHALLENGED WOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED IMMEDIATELY ON CHALLENGE, BUT ONLY AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD CONSIDERED AND FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE CHALLENGED DECISIONS. USUN FURTHER HAS ARGUED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT UNEF

PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IS WORKING IN A MANNER WHICH PROVIDES QUITE A SATISFACTORY PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, IT WOULD STILL BE IN OUR INTEREST TO FIRM UP AGREED GUIDELINES AS THIS WOULD TEND TO DISCOURAGE THE NON-ALIGNED FROM EMPLOYING THE "UNITING FOR PEACE" MECHANISM TO INSTITUTE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS UNDER GENERAL ASSEMBLY AUTHORIZATION IF THE DESIRED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WERE VETOED BY THE COUNCIL (AS IN THE CASE OF THE 1956 POST-SUEZ PEACEKEEPING PROPOSALS).

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS. WHILE WE HAVE SOME SKEPTICISM THAT THE NON-ALIGNED, IF THEY DESIRED IN THE FUTURE TO EMPLOY THE "UNITING FOR PEACE" PROCEDURE, WOULD BE MUCH INHIBITED BY THE FACT THAT THE ASSEMBLY HAD AGREED ON GUIDELINES ILLUSTRATING THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PRIMACY IN THE PEACEKEEPING AREA, WE BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE MERIT IN PURSUING FUTURE EFFORTS WITH THE SOVIETS TO ACHIEVE PEACEKEEPING GUIDELINES. THE TIMING OF ANY NEW APPROACH TO THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 065436

SOVIETS SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION; A) THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGE OF MENTIONING PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD AT THE SUMMIT; AND B) HAVING A RECORD OF NEW US EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT FOR THE NEXT UNGA.

3. WE SEE THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS:

SUBSTANTIVE OPTIONS:

OPTION 1: ASK SOVIETS TO RELAUNCH TALKS WITHOUT CHANGE IN US SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. STATE TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE DISAPPOINTED BY THE LACK OF SOVIET REACTION TO OUR MARCH 1974 PROPOSALS AND TO OUR INDICATION IN JANUARY THAT WE COULD EXPLORE THE BRITISH VETO BY CHALLENGE IDEA DESPITE OUR RESERVATIONS. WE BELIEVE, NEVERTHELESS, THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF THE SOVIET UN MISSION WERE AUTHORIZED TO UNDERTAKE EARLY AND SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON THIS BASIS WITH A VIEW TO FINDING COMMON GROUND. (WE ARE PREPARED TO FOLLOW UP WITH TALKS IN

MOSCOW IF THE PROSPECTS SO WARRANT.)

PROS: A. THIS WOULD NOT DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS AS WE NOW PERCEIVE THEM IN THE AREA OF DEFINING PEACEKEEPING GUIDELINES.

B. IT WOULD HOPEFULLY GALVANIZE THE SOVIET MISSION WHICH, UNDER AMBASSADOR MALIK, HAS BEEN UNFORTHCOMING IN THIS AREA.

C. IT WOULD ESTABLISH A POSITIVE RECORD OF OUR EFFORTS IN THE EYES OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

D. IT WOULD STRENGTHEN COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS.

CONS: A. BY GOING BACK TO THE SOVIETS AND INDICATING MOVEMENT IN OUR POSITION, IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THEIR INFLEXIBLE STAND WAS PAYING OFF.

OPTION 2: ACCEPT VETO BY CHALLENGE IF SOVIETS CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 065436

ABANDON ART. 29 COMMITTEE. WE COULD APPROACH THE SOVIETS REFERRING TO OUR MARCH 1974 PROPOSALS AND STATE THAT IF THEY WERE WILLING TO ABANDON THEIR INSISTENCE ON AN ARTICLE 29 SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR CONTROLLING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ENTER SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF A VIABLE COMPROMISE BASED ON VETO BY CHALLENGE PROCEDURE PROPOSED BY THE BRITISH. AGAIN, WE WOULD ENVISAGE FOLLOW-UP NEGOTIATIONS INITIALLY IN NEW YORK, WITH LATER TALKS POSSIBLY IN MOSCOW.

PROS: A. BY CONDITIONING A DISCUSSION OF THE VETO BY CHALLENGE PROCEDURE ON SOVIET ABANDONMENT OF INSISTENCE ON A SUBSIDIARY CONTROL COMMITTEE UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE WOULD BE RE-QUIRING THE SOVIETS TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT RATHER THAN DOING ALL THE MOVEMENT OURSELVES.

B. THIS WOULD ESTABLISH OUR RECORD OF POSITIVE EFFORTS IN THE EYES OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

CONS: A. BY CONDITIONING THE DISCUSSIONS, WE WOULD DECREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING THEM STARTED AND HENCE THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING COMMON GROUND.

OPTION 3: TAKE NO BILATERAL INITIATIVE WITH SOVIETS NOW. IN VIEW OF SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO OUR PROPOSALS OF MARCH 1974 AND TO OUR STATED WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE VETO BY CHALLENGE, WE SHOULD LEAVE THE BALL IN THE SOVIET COURT IN ORDER NOT TO APPEAR TO BE PURSUING THE SOVIETS WITH NEW PROPOSALS OR CHANGES IN OUR POSITION.

PROS: A. BY NOT PURSUING THE SOVIETS WITH FURTHER OFFERS, WE INDICATE THAT THE PRESENT CONDUCT OF PEACEKEEPING (E.G. UNEF AND UNFICYP) OPERATIONS IS SATISFACTORY AND WE ARE NOT IN A HURRY TO ESTABLISH DIFFERENT PRACTICES. HENCE, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO SHOW SOME MOVEMENT IF THEY ARE DISSATISFIED.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 065436

CONS: A. WE FURTHER DELAY THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING GUIDELINES WHICH, GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE NEXT SYG REGARDING PEACEKEEPING, ARE IN OUR LONG-RUN INTEREST TO ESTABLISH.

RECOMMENDATION: IO AND EUR RECOMMEND THAT WE FOLLOW SUBSTANTIVE OPTION 1 AND CARRY IT OUT EITHER BY MEANS OF A LETTER FROM YOU WHICH AMBASSADOR STOESSEL WOULD PRESENT TO GROMYKO OR IF YOU SEE THIS IN THE SUMMIT TIME FRAME, THROUGH YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH GROMYKO. WITH REGARD TO THE LOCUS OF THE DISCUSSIONS, IO RECOMMENDS THAT THEY START IN NEW YORK WHERE BOTH SIDES HAVE SENIOR PERSONNEL WELL VERSED IN THE MATTER BUT THAT WE NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING THEM FURTHER IN MOSCOW LATER IN THE SPRING SHOULD THE INITIAL TALKS REVEAL THE POSSIBILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT BY THE TIME OF THE SUMMIT.

OPTION 1: ASK SOVIETS TO RELAUNCH TALKS WITHOUT CHANGE IN US SUBSTANTIVE POSITION.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

OPTION 2: ACCEPT VETO BY CHALLENGE IF SOVIETS ABANDON ART. 29 COMMITTEE.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

OPTION 3: TAKE NO BILATERAL INITIATIVE WITH SOVIETS NOW.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

PROCEDURAL OPTIONS: IF YOU CHOOSE OPTIONS 1 OR 2, THE INITIAL DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THEIR POSITION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

1. HAVE AMBASSADOR STOESSEL PRESENT A LETTER OR VERBAL MESSAGE FROM YOU TO GROMYKO.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 065436

2. HAVE DEPUTY SECRETARY CALL IN THE SOVIET CHARGE (OR DOBRYNIN WHEN HE RETURNS) AND MAKE THE PROPOSAL THROUGH THAT CHANNEL.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

3. TAKE UP ISSUE WITH GROMYKO AT YOUR NEXT ENCOUNTER.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

CLEARANCES: EUR:ARMITAGE(DRAFT); S/P:KONTOS(DRAFT);
S:LPBREMER; C:HSonnenfeldt. INGERSOLL UNQUOTE KISSINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC 949, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, PEACE PLANS
Control Number: S7505705
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 MAR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ElyME
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE065436
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: C:RBLACKWILL
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750102-0566
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750399/baaaagvp.tel
Line Count: 334
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 MAY 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 MAY 2003 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <07 OCT 2003 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, UR, US, XF, UN, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: HAMBURG
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006